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ABSTRACT 
There is now strong scientific evidence that several species of  baleen 
whale  and possibly  the sperm whale,  have  recovered  to levels  that 
would  support  commercial  harvest.  The  stock  of  fin  whales 
(Balaenoptera physatus) off  the eastern coast of Iceland and the minke 
whale  (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) in the Northeast Atlantic. off  the 
coast of  Japan and in the Southern Ocean  are prime candidates for 
commercial harvest.  Should commercial whaling be resumed?  If  so. 
what role  should economics play in determining the level of  harvest 
and management policies? 
A bioeconomic  model  for  baleen whales is developed  and applied  to 
the stock  of  minke  whales  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic.  A  delay- 
difference equation is used to model the population  dynamics and an 
exponential  production  function  is  estimated  relating  harvest,  to 
population  size and the number  of  catcher vessels.  If whaling  is 
resumed, the optimal stock size and harvest may critically depend on 
the price-cost  ratio and catcher productivity.  We  identify plausible 
combinations of  price,  cost and productivity  where  whaling  is  not 
optimal  and  the minke whale  population  in  the Northeast Atlantic 
equilibrates at about 82,000 adult animals.  Under a high price-cost 
ratio and high  catcher productivity,  the optimal  stock  ranges from 
51,000 to 59,000 whales  supporting  a  harvest  of  1,600 to  1,750 
by 90 to 115 catchers. 
The paper examines two economic arguments that might be advanced 
for prohibition of  commercial whaling.  The first is utilitarian in nature 
and  the  second  is  based  on  the  extension  of  rights  traditionally 
reserved  for  homo  sapiens.  The paper advocates a tolerant position, 
where  individuals  of  different  countries  democraticalty  choose 
whether they wish to allow or ban whaling and the import of  whale 
products,  with  the  proviso  that  no  stock  be  threatened  with 
extinction. 
Key  Words:  economics, whaling, rnlnke abide Economics and the Resumption of Commercial Whw 
I.  Introduction and Overview 
In  1986 the International Whaling Commission  (IWC) 
declared a five-year moratorium on commercial whaling.  The 
moratorium had been adopted for at least three reasons.  First, there 
was scientific evidence that many of  the stocks of  baleen whales were 
dangerously depleted and making only slow recovery from the 
intensive whaling that had taken place between the two World Wars 
and in the thirty-pear period following World War  11.'  Second, there 
was a conspicuous lack of information on the status of  many stocks, 
and therefore little basis for making informed decisions on allowable 
harvest.*  Third, and perhaps most important, the whale had become 
a powerful symbol within the environmental movement.  For many, 
the depleted stocks of  baleen whales, in particular the blue whale 
(Balaenoptera rnusculus),Q-pified  the "tragic" result of  man's 
exploitation of  the enx4ronrnent and common proper@ resources. 
During the moratorium several countxies, including Iceland, 
Japan and Norway, continued to harvest a limited number of  large baleen whales for scientific purposes.  The beluga or white whale 
(Delphinapterus kucas)  is harvested by both U. S, and Soviet 
Eskimos.  The narwhal [Monodon monoceros) and the beluga are 
harvested by natives of  Canada and Greenland.  These whales are 
classified as "small cetaceans" by the nVC, which has little control 
over the level of  harvest.  The bowhead whale is a large cetacean. 
harvested by the Alaskan Eskimo under the IWC's aboriginal 
exemption.  Quotas on the number of  bowhead whales shuck and the 
number actually harvested are used to control the mortality from the 
Eskimo hunt (see Conrad, 1989). 
It was agreed that during the moratorium scientific surveys 
would be conducted to estimate current stock size and to provide a 
basis for estimating life-history parameters, important in modeling 
the dynamics of  whale populations.  Updated stock estimates were to 
be presented at the IWC meetings in Reykjavik, Iceland in May of 
1991 and the IWC would then determine whether the moratorium 
should be extended or whether commercial whaling might resume. 
If commercial -*haling  were allowed, harvest would presumably come 
from stocks which the PIVG  foimeiiy classified as '*sustained 
management" or "initial mmagement." A sustained mmagement 
stock was one estimated to fie within  10Yo below to 20% above the 
2 stock level supporting maximum sustainable yield (XMs),  while an 
initial management stock would have recovered to more than 20% 
above XMS(.  Stocks lying more than 10%below XhlSY would remain 
protected under the old IWC  classification system (Breiwick 1983). A 
Revised Management Procedure (RMP) will  be used in future stock 
classification.  This is a more complex procedure that it is still being 
modified by the IWC.  Neither the old nor the revised classification 
scheme incorporates economic considerations. 
There is, of  course, a more fundamental question.  Should 
whales be harvested at all?  Different cultures have answered this 
question differently at different times.  The answer may hinge on the 
degree to which a society has vested rights traditiondly reserved for 
homo sapiens to other animal species.  We  will  return to this 
question in Section IV. 
If commercial whaling is resumed, how should economic 
factors, like the cost of  harvest, the prices for whale products and the 
rate of  discount affect the optimal stock and rate of  harvest?  Spence 
(1974) was one of  the first economists to develop a bioeconomic 
model and apply it to the stock of  blue whales in the Southern 
~cean.~ While innovative, Spence's model of  population dyramics was 
unrealistic, and led to implausible rates of  recovery.4 
3 Clark (19'96)employs a more realistic delay-difference 
equation to describe the population dynamics of  the fin whale 
[Bduenopteraphysafus),also in the Southem Ocean.  His cost 
function, however, is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function which is an unrealistic fonn when harvesting from a stock 
5  resource. 
Clark and Lamberson (1982) provide an economic history of 
modem whaling in the Southern Ocean and develop an aggregate 
model of  optimal harvest which draws from the theoretical work of 
Clark, Clarke and Munro (1979). A simple continuous-time model, 
employing a symmetric logistic function and a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, is used to estimate the optimal stock of  baleen 
whales (in blue whale units) and the sustainable harvest it would 
support. 
Conrad (1989) develops a model to examine the hunt for the 
bowhead whale as conducted by the the Alaskan Eskimo.  The hunt 
contributes to the continuity of  cultural traditions and the subsistence 
economy within Eskimo villages.  No formal production function was 
specified; ratber the optimal stock and harvest were determined as a 
function of  the discount sate and a relative weight assigned to the 
stock of  bowhead whales. The purpose of  this paper is to develop a more realistic 
model of  commercial whaling: one that is based on a deiay-difference 
equation for growth and an exponential production function.  The 
model is  applied to the stock of  minke whales (Balaenoptera 
acutorostrata) in the Northeast Atlantic,  This stock was never 
regarded as endangered and is a candidate for commercial harvesL6 
We  identie economic conditions where the resumption of 
commercial whaling is optimal and where it is not. 
In the next section we present a model of  population 
dynamics for baleen whales.  This is followed by a section which 
develops a bioeconomic model.  In both of  these sections we will 
identify plausible functional forms and estimate or assign parameter 
values thought to be appropriate for the minke whale in the 
Northeast Atlantic.  We  then derive rules for optimal escapement, 
stock, harvest and effort, provide numerical solutions for a range of 
economic parameters and identify conditions when commercial 
harvest might be economically justified.  The fourth section examines 
the economic basis of certain animal-rights arguments to prevent ihe 
resumption of  cornmerciai whaling.  The fifth section summa~zes  our 
major conclusions. 11.  Population Dynamics 
The dynamics of  whale populations are frequentIy modeled 
using a delay-difference equation (Clark 1976).  If the species is not 
subject to harvest this equation might take the general form 
where X,  is the stock of  adult (sexually mature) whales in year t, M is 
the annual rate of  mortality in adults, and F(Xt.;)  is a recruitment 
function defining the recruits to the adult population in year t+l  as a 
function of  the adult population in year t-T.  The recruitment function 
is assumed to incorporate certain environmental constraints 
including the overall avaiIabi1it-j  of food and its effect on the relative 
rate of  population growth. 
If the adult population is unchanging over some interval of 
time, then natural mortality is precisely offset by recruitment and 
MXo = I?(%).  The equilibrium or fixed point, &,will be stable if 
IF-(X,] I  .; M, where Fa(*) is the first derivative of  F(*). This 
equilibrium is sometimes referred to as the "pristine popula"jon," 
thought to efist prior to the start of  commercial exploitation. 
6 With a commercial harvest of  Yt  < Xt adult whales per year it 
is useful to define escapement as Zt = X, - Y,  > 0. Equation (1) is then 
modified  to become 
Thus, the adult stock in year t+l  is determined by the unharvested 
adults which survive from year t, plus recruitment, which is a 
function of  escapement in year t-T. 
The generalized logistic function is often used in modeling 
whale populations.  In this case the recruitment function becomes 
where r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is a positive parameter, 
which along with r, M and a defines the pristine population.  The 
value of  CL mill affect the symmetry of  F(X,.,).  If a > 1, the generalized 
logistic is skewed to the left and the maximum recruitment level lies 
above 0.5K.The IlVC belreves rn~mum recmitmcnt occurs at about 
0.6K, which is the case when a = 2.39.  For the generalized logiskc 
the pristine population is given by X, = ~[(r-~l/rl"~. 
7 In addition to a. the parameters. M, r, K and -I must be 
estimated if one wishes to simulate population dynamics using the 
generalized logistic.  Wile specific estimates of all of  these 
parameters for the minke whale population in the Northeast Atlantic 
are lacking, values are available from studies of  other minke whale 
stocks or from models of  other species of  baleen whale. 
Wallse et al. (1987)  use an  annual mortality rate of  0.10 in 
their study of  the minke whale in the Northeast Atlantic.  The age at 
sexual maturity appears to vary by sex, with females reaching maturity 
at about 7 years, and males at about six years of  age [Christensen 
1981). We  set T = 7, a value that is also used by Wallee et al. (1987). 
Estimates for r and K are particularly troublesome.  We  ran 
several simulations with M = 0.10, T = 7 and various combinations of  r 
and K.  The results when r = 0.15 and K = 130,000 are shoxvn in 
Table 1,  These values imply a pristine population level of  Xo = 82,093 
adult whales and a 1990 population of  58,742 mature animals.  Th~s 
seems to be a conservative result, given that over  100,000 whales 
were harvested by Korwegran uvhalers between  1938 and  1987 and 
that recent estimates by Ugland (19861 place the current stock 
between 50,000 and 80.000 whales. In Table  1. the data on harvest comes Pram  CIien  et al. f1387) 
and Statistisk Sentralbyr5 (1989).  Data on vessel numbers prior to 
1946 were not available.  For the period  1946 to 1987 the data on 
vessel numbers comes from Statistisk Sentralbyrfi (1978 and 1989). 
In simulating the minke whale population it was assumed 
that the stock was in equilibrium at the pristine population for the 
years 1931 -1938 and that whaling effectively commenced in 1938. 
According to this simulation the stock of  minke whales declines from 
the pristine population to a low of  slightly less than 52,000 whales in 
1973, after which it slowly climbs to 58,742 adults in 1990.  Our 
estimates of  stock size are plotted in Figure 2, while harvest and 
vessel numbers are plotted in Figures 1 and 3, respectively. 
Variations in the underlying parameters will  result in 
different stock estimates.  By reducing r or increasing M it is possible 
to reduce the population to significantly lower  level^.^  The resulting 
1990 population, however, is then below the lower bound estimates 
of  recent studies using mark-recapture, line transect or other stock 
assessment methods.  While there is considerable uncertainty over 
the "We"  vaIue of  the biological parameters, the values adopted here 
are plausibIe, mdthey collectively lead to estimates of  the pristine 
population and the stock in  1990which we regard  as conservative. 
9 PII.  Sfoeconomfcs 
If  commercial harvest is resumed it will probably be 
necessary to regulate the hunt in order to avoid the inefficiencies of 
open access.  An optimal quota and fleet size can be calculated for the 
rninke whale stock in the Northeast Atlantic.  It will depend, in part, 
on the efficiency, prices and cost facing the remnants of  a fleet which 
has been idle or regeared for other fisheries. 
Suppose that the price per harvested whale is constant. 
denoted by p, and that the cost of  harvesting Y,whales froni a 
population of  size Xt is given by the cost function C(Yt,Xt).  Net 
revenue in year t may then be written as 
Maximization of  the present value of  net revenue subject to 
the dynamics of  the whale population may be stated as 
Subject to  Xbl  = (l - h?)Z, iF(Z,_,) where p = l/(l  + 6) is a discount factor and 6 is the rate of  discount. 
Conrad (1989) derives the first-order necessary conditions 
for this problem.  When they are evaluated in steady state. optimal 
escapement will be defined by the equation 
where xx and xr  are the partial derivatives of  x(Y,X) and F'(Z1 is the 
first derivative of  the recruitment function. 
Suppose the production function, relating harvest to stock 
size and effort takes the exponential form Y = X(l - eAqE), where E is 
the level of  effort and the parameter q > 0 might be referred to as the 
"catchability coefficient." 
If the unit cost of  effort is constant, denoted by c, then the 
cost equation is C = cE.  Solving the production function for E as  a 
function of  Y and X and substituting into the cost equation one obtains 
a cost function which takes the form C = (e/q)in[X/(X- YJ],  where 
In[-]denotes the natural log operator.  Substituting fbe cost function 
into the expression for net revenue results in the partial derivatives 
% = cY//(IX(X- 31  and % = [pq(X- Y)  - cl/[qCL - -r71,  When these 
11 partial derivatives are substituted into equation (51,  and using the 
definition Z = X - Y,it is possible (after quite a bit of  algebra) to obtain 
an expression defining X as  a function of  2. This takes the form 
Evaluating the delay-difference equation in steady state, it is 
possible to obtain an expression defining Y as a function of  Z.  This is 
less tedious algebraically, and takes the form 
By substituting the last two expressions into the definition of 
escapement we can obtain a single expression in Z.  Unfortunately, it 
is not possible to obtain an explicit expression for optimal 
escapement, but we can write the implicit form as 
where $(~)=p~(l-(a+l)(~/~)a)  O~tilnal and B(zI=~+~-M-~(z/K)". 
12 escapement is a root or zero of  G(Z1.  If  a root exists, the optimal 
values of  X and Y can be obtained from equations (6) and (7). 
The optimal level of  escapement depends on the five 
biological parameters a,  M, r, K and T and on three economic 
parameters: q, (p/c) and 6.  With our simulated values for the minke 
whale stock we are in a position to directly estimate a production 
function,  While this stock was harvested commercially until 1988, 
the fleet of  Norwegian vessels came under quota restrictions as early 
as 1973 (Wall~e  et al. 1987). We  opted for a sample period from 
1952 through 1972 and estimated the exponential production 
function Y = X(l - e-qE)  by regressing ln[(X -%/XI  on effort, E, 
measured as the vessel numbers.  One would anticipate a negative 
coefficient on effort and an insignificant constant. 
The results are shown in Table 2 for OLS regressions with 
and without correction for first-order autocorrelation.  The estimate 
for q is 2.7045E-4 without correction and 2.4465E-4 with correction 
and both are significant at the 1%level.  The constant is not 
significant at the 5% levef  in either regression and is dropped from 
the equation.  In +he nurnerieai analysis that follows q will be set at 
2.0E-4, 2.5E-4 and 3,OE-4. The relative price-cost ratio (p/c) was calcuiated for the 
years 1980-1987.  Table 3 contains data on the total number of 
whales taken by vessels in the small-whale fleet and the total revenue 
(in nominal Norwegian Kroner) obtained from meat and blubber. 
Dividing total revenue by the number of  whales we obtain a price per 
whale.  Table 3 also contains estimates of  the operating cost of  a 
small-ukale vessel for an entire season of  approximately 36 weeks. 
During each season vessels would typically participate in other 
fisheries.  It was estimated that during this period approximately 35 
to 41 percent of  operating time was spent whaling.  The p/c ratios in 
the right-most column of Table 3 are calculated by dividing price per 
whale by cost per vessel.  If it were appropriate to prorate costs to 
different fisheries by their percentage of  time during a full season, 
then the (p/c) ratios might increase by a factor of  1/(0.38) = 2.63. 
U'e  set (p/c) at 0.05, 0.07 and 0.09. which, as it turns out, covers a 
critical range of  operating behavior and resource management. 
The final economic parameter needed  to calculate optimal 
escapement is 6, the discount rate.  In our sensitivity analysis, we set 
S at 0.02, 0.04 and 0.06.  A simple interactive algorithm was 
developed to find the zero of  G(Z) in equation !8)which proved  to be 
unique and stable. The results are displayed in Table 4. 
14 There are three blocks to Table 4 corresponding to the base- 
case q = 2.53-4 and then a less productive fleet (q = 2.OE-4) and a 
more productive fleet [q = 3.OE-4).  Within each block the price-cost 
ratio is varied vertically and the discount rate horizontally.  For the 
base-case q and the median values of  (p/c) and 6, the optimal stock is 
68,142 adult whales supporting a harvest of  1,297 adults taken by 77 
catcher boats.  Within the base-case q block, the optimal stock ranges 
from a high level 81,052 whales [at (p/c) = 0.05 and 6 = 0.021 to a low 
of  57,770 whales [at (p/c) = 0.09 and 6 = 0.06).  The high stock was 
associated with a harvest of  137 whales taken by 7 catcher boats, 
while the low stock was associated with a harvest 1.675 whales taken 
by 1 18  vessels. 
When the catchability coefficient is reduced to q = 2.OE-4, 
we  observe that whaling becomes unprofitable at the low price-cost 
ratio.  In the long run the stock returns to & = 82.093 whales.  In 
general, the reduction in q causes an increase in the optimal stock 
and a decrease in harvest and fleet size, ceteris paribus. 
The case where whal~ng  becomes unprofitable due to a low 
price-cost ratio may be of  relevance ~fcommercial whaling is 
resumed,  In  1981,when a totat of  1.890 whales were harvested from 
Northeast and Central stocks [see Table 31,  the adjusted price-cost ratio would have been (2.63)*(0.02)  = 0.0526.  At this ratio whaling 
would have been unprofitable for vessels with a catchability coefficient 
of  q = 2.OE-4. 
It is not possible to estimate q for later years, since the 
catchers were constrained by quota.  It is believed that as newer 
catchers replaced older vessels, q increased.  The five-year 
moratorium, however, may have had the effect of  reducing the 
efficiency of  both catchers, that have been idle or regeared for other 
fisheries, and their crews. 
It is not known what the price elasticity for whale meat will 
be in the primary fish markets of  Japan.  It is also not known if Japan 
will commence whaling from a stock of  minke whales which migrates 
through their coastal waters, nor the number of  whales they might 
harvest.  If markets are slow to expand and demand is ineIastic, the 
resumption of  commercial whaling may be short-lived for purely 
economic reasons. 
The final block in Table 4 corresponds to the high 
productivity case.  Here the optimal stock may fall as  low as 51,538 
whales; slightly below the minimum of  our simulation in Table 1. 
This stock would be optimal under a high price-cost ratio and a high 
discount rate.  In this case 1,736  whales are harvested by 114 vessels. At  the other extreme, a [p/c) = 0.05 and 6 = 0.02, the optimal stock 
is 74,353. supporting a harvest of  853whales by 38 vessels. 
These results seem plausible in light of  the historical 
landings listed in Table 1. Annual harvests that exceeded 2,000 
whales during the 1950s and 1960s caused the stock to decline to 
about 52,000 whales by the mid-1960s.  Harvests around 1,500 
during the 1970s appear, in our simulation, to have been sustainable. 
The regulation of  fisheries by individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) is gaining acceptance.  Muse and Schelle (1989) describe 
programs in the United States, New  Zealand, Canada and Iceland.  If 
the Norwegian government allows the resumption of  whaling, the 
distribution of  transferable quota to some initial number of  catchers 
might be considered.  If whaling proves profitable there is likely to be 
new investment.  More  efficient, lower-cost catchers could enter the 
fleet as existing quota holders upgrade their vessels or as prospective 
entrants purchase or rent quota from less efficient operators. 
Management of  commercial whaling under a system of  ITQs 
might also allow individuals opposed to whaling to purchase quota, 
retire it, and thereby allow the stock to increase to levels that would 
perhaps reflect existence or other "nonconsumptive" values. IV. Externalities and Animal-Rights 
The analysis of  the previous section would imply that a 
sustainable harvest of  minke whales from the stock in the Northeast 
Atlantic is feasible and, under certain bioeconomic conditions, 
profitable.s  Should it be resumed? 
There are two economic arguments which might be 
advanced for making the current moratorium permanent.  The first 
relates to the neoclassical notion of  externality, while the second is 
based on the notion of  property, specifically the evolution of  common 
property to private property and,in the case of  marine mammals, to 
the extension of  rights traditionally reserved for the species homo 
sapiens. 
From the perspective of  neoclassical economics, the killing 
of  wildlife or the slaughter of  domestically-raised animals may 
negatively affect the utility of  individuals who place a value on animal 
life as opposed to a value based on the products which might be 
derived from that animal.  The animal's welfare, defined from a 
human perspective, enters positively into the individual's utility 
function.  Such individuals would oppose  killing of  animals unless 
they could be con\~nced  that some more valuable purpose was being served.  If meat and blubber are not sufficiently important to warrant 
the killing of  a whale, perhaps medical research or some other 
purpose might be of  high enough value to offset the negative utility 
from taking an animal's life.g 
In the past thirty years a number of  charter boats have 
specialized in cruises to observe whales.  One would  expect that 
individuals paying for such a cruise might be opposed to the 
resumption of  commercial whaling. either because of  the negative 
utility from their death or because whales from populations at their 
pristine equilibria would be more frequently encountered.  Should 
commercial whalers compensate would-be watchers or should whale 
watchers compensate (bribe) whalers not to whale?  This appears to 
be a classic externality problem, although the likelihood of 
internalization by Coasian negotiation seems remote. 
This utilitarian philosophy, while allowing animal life to have 
value beyond the products they might provide, is conceptually 
distinct from a strict animal-rights perspective.  Under this 
perspective all animals are seen as having he  same rights to life as 
bzomo sapiens.  Here there is no human-derived value to ariimal life, 
rather other species are equal in their right to a full and "natural" life. 
Stone (1974) discusses the historical evolution and ultimately the extension of  basic human rights to all races of  mankind and asks 
whether such rights should be extended to natural objects.  Humans 
can no longer be regarded as private property, although this was not 
the case as recently as 150years ago in the United States. 
In the great American novel Moby Dick. Chapter 89. is 
entitled Fast-fsh and  Loose-fik  and Melville (1851) puts forth 
perhaps the earliest discussion on the distinction between common 
property and private property.  In the heyday of  American whaling "a 
fast-fish belongs to the party fast to it,"  while "a loose-fish is fair game 
for anybody who can soonest catch it."  Such rules were important in 
regulating the conduct on crowded whaling grounds when boats from 
different ships might have the opportunity to strike a whale which 
was already harpooned.  Melville saw the notion as applicable to 
human behavior as  well, specifically the economic relationships 
between landlord and renter and creditor and debtor.  ("And what are 
you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?") 
Have whales evolved from being regarded as common 
property to ha~lng  full and equal rights to man?  Do the products 
currently derived from baleen whales justify their harvest? 
The  to these questions will vary within and across 
cultures.  We  advocate a tolerant position, where inditiduals of 
20 different countries are allowed to democratically choose whether 
they wish to allow or ban whaling and the import of  whale products. 
The recommendations of  the WC  are not binding on 
individual countries, but they do carry significant weight in the 
international community.  If the IWC  should approve whaling from 
stocks regarded as  abundant, it would give a stamp of  legitimacy to 
countries such as Japan, Iceland and Nonvay who wish to resume 
whaling.  If the IWC  recommends an extension of  the moratorium, 
individual countries could defy that recommendation and unilaterally 
resume whaling, especially for stocks within their territorial waters. 
The risk of  such unilateral action is that a large, norwhaling country 
may impose econon~ic  sanctions. 
Iceland and Norway are small countries that export a large 
volume of  fish. such as cod and salmon, to the United States.  If the 
IWC  does not rescind the moratorium, and if Iceland, Norway and 
even Japan were to resume whaling, conservation groups within the 
United States and possibly Europe are likely to lobby for a ban on all 
imports from whaling countries.  If the RVC  approves the resumption 
of whaling, the ability of  such groups to successfulty lobby for Wade 
restrictions may be diminished. V.  Conclusions 
The core of  this paper is a bioeconomic model that might be 
used to evaluate the long run net economic value from the 
resumption of  commercial whaling.  This is a contentious issue, one 
which the IWC seems ill-equipped to handle.  The limited number of 
bioeconomic models that have been developed to examine the 
optimal management of  baleen whales have not been presented at the 
IWC meetings, nor have they appeared in its published reports. 
These studies, while well-founded in the economics of  dynamic 
optimization, have often suffered from unrealistic assumptions about 
growth and production.  The delay-difference equation and 
exponential production function have strong intuitive appeal and 
seem to fit the historical data for the minke whale in the Northeast 
Atlantic.  These functional forms lead to an optimal escapement rule 
which depends on eight bioeconomic parameters and which is 
readily solved by basic numerical methods.  The minke whale is 
abundant in both the Pacific and Southern Oceans and is a prime 
candidate for harvest in these areas as well.  As better estimates of 
the bioeconomic pameters  become available our model can be up- 
dated and the long-run opLimum recalculated. 
22 Analysis of  the minke whale in the Northeast Atlantic is 
based on what we regard as a conservative set of  biological 
parameters.  The stock declines from about 82,000 adult whales in 
1938 to just under 52.000 whales in 1973.  Under a strict quota, 
beginning in  1984, and the limited scientific harvest in  1988 and 
1989, the stock slowly recovers to just under 59,000 whales in 1990. 
Our analysis identified a critical combination for the price- 
cost ratio and catchability coefficient.  Commercial harvest will not be 
optimal for low producti'irity vessels (q = 2.0E-4) facing a low price- 
cost ratio (p/c = 0.05).  This is true for 0.02 s6 (0.06.  At the other 
extreme, a highly productive fleet (q = 3.OE-4) facing a high price- 
cost ratio (p/c = 0.09) will harvest  1,736 whales from an optimal 
stock of  51,538 whales using 114 catchers.  Given the moratorium, 
there is little current information on the likely productivity of  vessels 
or the price elasticity for meat and blubber.  Large volumes of  meat 
being supplied to limited markets in Japan may make large scale 
whaling unprofitable on purely economic grounds. 
Should commercial whaling be resumed?  The answer will 
vay  within and across cultures.  It is perhaps appropriate for each 
country to choose whether to allow or prohibit whaling subject to the 
proviso that no stock be threatened i'ilth extinction. Endnotes 
'Baleen  whales, of  the suborder mysticeti are equipped with baleen 
plates that hang from the upper jaw and are used like a sieve or 
strainer as the whale swims through swarms of  plankton or schools of 
small fish.  The other living suborder is odontoceti, or toothed 
whales.  Members of  this suborder, such as the sperm whale, 
Physefer rnacrocephalus, feed on squid, Iarger fish and, in the case 
of  the killer whale, Orcinus orca, squid, fish, seals and porpoise. 
*1n a special issue of  the hfarine Fisheries Review. devoted to the 
status of w-hales, Braham (1984) lists eight endangered species. 
Seven are baleen whales and the other is the sperm whale.  Each 
species had two or more "unit stocks," thought to be relatively 
independent groups that might be managed as a separate unit.  At 
that time, eight stocks were thought to be less than 10%of  their 
pre-exploitation level,  13 stocks were listed as having no reliable 
population estimate, and only two stocks were thought to have 
recovered; those being the gray whale, Eschrichtius robustus, in the 
Eastern North Pacific, and the humpback, ,$,fegaplerirnovaeangline, 
in the Western North Atlantic. 'The  Southern Ocean refers to the southern portions of  the Atlantic, 
Pacific and Indian Oceans surrounding Antarctica. 
4~n Spence's model the dynamics of  the blue whale stock was 
characterized by the first-order difference equation  = &-Y,, 
where Xt is the stock of  blue whales, and Y, is annual harvest.  For his 
estimates of  a = 8.356 and b = 0.8204, an initial stock of  Xo = 1,639 
whales would grow to a population of  120,000  whales in 17 years 
with zero harvest (Yt = 0). Harvest of  the blue whale was banned by 
the IWC  irt  1967 and the most recent estimates of  the blue whale 
population in all oceans is about 10,000 (Darling 1988). 
5~1ark's analysis of  the fin whale assumes a production function of  the 
form Yt = qXtEt, where El is a measure of  effort, say the number of 
factory vessels or catcher boats.  For a given estimate of  the 
catchability coefficient, q z 0, and a finite stock level X,,  there are 
finite levels of  effort for which Yt  > X,.  A more plausible form for the 
production function, one used by Spence and one which will be used 
In the application in this paper, is 'r; - X,I1  - e-"~'), %he minke whale is the smallest of  the rorquals; a group that 
includes the blue, fin and sei (Balaenoptera borealis) whale.  Being 
the smallest, it was the last whale to be intensively harvested by 
whalers working the Southern Ocean in the early and mid-twentieth 
century [Clark and Larnberson  1982). The population in the northern 
hemisphere is generally thought to be separate from the population 
in the southern hemisphere.  The delineation of  separate 
(noninteraeting) stocks in the north Atlantic is subject to debate, but 
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) recognizes four stocks 
defined by area as (I]  the Canadian East Coast Stock. (2) the West 
Greenland Stock, (3)the Central North Atlantic Stock and (4) the 
Northeast Atlantic Stock.  This latter stock migrates along the 
Norwegian coast into the Barents Sea. 
7~  key relationship is (r - M), sometimes referred to as the maximum 
rate of  net recruitment.  ?%%en  r = 0.13, and all other parameters are 
the same,  = 70,386 and the population  declines to a low of  24,226 
in 1984 before rising to 26,687 in  1990.  \%%en r = 0.14,  = 76,966 
and the population declines to 39,309, also in  1984, increasing to 
33,794 by  1990.  In each case, the simulated stock Level  for  1990 
fails below the lower limit of  50,000 estimated by  Ugland  (1986). 
26 8If the price per whale is  50,000 NK and the prorated  cost of  whaling 
is 714,286 NK,  so that (p/c) = 0.07, and if q = 2.5E-4 and 6 = 0.04, 
then, given the other biological parameters, the optimal base-case) 
stock is X = 68,142 with a harvest of  Y = 1,297 adult whales.  The 
annual net revenue is a(X,Y) = pY  - (c/q)ln(X/IX - Y)) = 9,943,386 hX 
with a present value of  a = x(X,Y)(l+ 6)/6= 258,528,043 NK.  At  an 
exchange rate of 6.5 NK  = I USD these values transIate to 
$1,529,751 and $39,773,545. respectively. 
'~abbits  have been used in testing the level of  irritation and the 
health risk from using certain chemicals in making eyeliner and 
mascara.  The animals undoubtedly suffered, and many were 
euthanized.  Indi~~duals concerned with animal welfare may not view 
the production of  eye make-up as a sufficiently compelling reason for 
the suffering and premature death of  any animal.  For some, however. 
there might be medical research, say cancer research, where the 
suffering and premature death of an animal might be justified  on an 
expected-utiiiq basis. References 
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58742  1990 Table 2.  Estimation of the Catchability Coefflcient for the 
Exponential Production Function Y = X(l  - eq?  for the 
period 1952 - 1972, where Y is Harvest. X is the 
Estimated Stock and E is the number of Vessels 
A.  OLS:  No  Correction for Autocorrelation, 
Dependent Variable: ln([X - %/XI 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t - ratio 
3  -2.70453-4  0.493603-4  -5.4790 
constant  -7.66833-3  7.99220E-3  -0.9595 
R-Square = 0.6124  R-Square Adjusted = 0.5920  F = 30.02 
Durbin-Watson = 1.1562 
B.  OLS:  Correction for First-Order Autocorrelation 
Dependent Variable: ln((X - %/X) 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t - ratio 
E  -2.44653-4  0.61  1413-4  -4.0014 
constant  -1.15573-2  9.963603-3  -1.1599 
rho  0.33145  0.20588  1.6099 
R-Square = 0.6559  R-Square Adjusted = 0.6378 
Durbin-Watson = 1.6454 Table 3.  The Relative Mce-Cost Ratio for the Petlod l9SO  - 1987 
Number of  Value of all  Price per  Cost per 
Whales'  Produc ts2  Whale 1013  Vessel14 
2,054  39,660,000  19,308  756,805  0.0255 
1,890  35,719,000  18,899  945,557  0.0200 
1,963  39,837,000  20,293  952,142  0.0213 
1.869  45,617,000  24,407  940,714  0.0259 
804  32.68 1,000  40.648  802.423  0.0510 
771  34,6263,000  44,910  1,007,118  0.0450 
383  20,489,000  53,496  846.068  0.0632 
375  21,294,000  56,784  944,670  0.0601 
'The  number of  whales Iisted in this table is larger than the number 
listed in Table 1because it includes the harvest of minke whales from 
the Central Atlantic stock.  Source:  Fiskeristatistikk 1987. 
2The primary products from the minke whale are meat and blubber 
which are consumed by Norwegians or exported to Japan for human 
consumption.  A very small fraction (less than one percent by weight) 
is processed into animal feed.  This value is given in nominal 
Norwegian Kroner.  Source:  Fiskeristatistikk 1987. 
3The price per whale. p, is calculated by dividing the value of  whale 
products by the number of  whales harvested. 
4During the period  1980 - 1987 vesseIs in the Norwegian coastal fleet 
operated appro~mately  36 weeks per year.  The cost estimates listed 
here are operating costs for the entire 36-week season.  During such 
a season a vessel would typically spend 35 to 41 percent of its time 
whaling.  The rest of  the time was spent harvesting cod, haddock, 
herring and other species.  The distribution of  costs between these 
fishing activities is  problematic.  If  it were appropriate to calculate 
whaling cost as season cost times the proportion of  time spent 
whaling, it would more than double the pic ratios Iisted in the right-
most column.  Source:  &nnsomhetsunders~kelserfor the years 
1980 - 1989. Table 4. The OptfmaI Stock, X, Harvest. Y,and Effort, E,in the 
Norwegian Wnlie Whale Industry for the Bioeconomfc 
Model with a e: 2.39, r = 0.15, K = 130.000, M = 0.10, 
z = 7and alternative dues  of q, 6 and p/c 
with q  = 2.-
6=Q.02  6 = 0.04  6=0.06 
X = 81,052  X = 80,995  X = 80.941 
Y=  137  Y=  145  Y=  151 
E=  7  E=  7  E=  8 
With q  = 2.0E4 
6=0,0.2  6=0,06 
X = 82.093  X = 82.093  X = 82.093 
Y=  0  Y=  0  Y=  0 
E=  0  E=  0  E=  0 
With q  = 3.0E-4 
5 = 0.02  6=004 
X = 74,353  X = 73,713  X = 73,172 
Y=  853  Y=  908  Y=  952 
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